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Abstract Government size, corruption, and tax
policy can influence allocation towards necessity or
opportunity-driven entrepreneurship. Using a compara-
tive multi-source sample across 52 countries during
2005–2015, we apply a mixed-process estimation of
the simultaneously unrelated system of equations and
unpack these heterogeneous and complex effects. Inter-
estingly, our results show that the influence of tax policy
and corruption on necessity and opportunity entrepre-
neurship depends on government size. Our results hold
for numerous robustness analyses.
Plain English summary Institutions matter for the
choice of opportunity and necessity-driven entrepre-
neurship. Government size, the level of corruption,
and tax policy directly affect entrepreneurs’ motiva-
tion and incentives. We study 52 countries during
2005–2015 to find out to what extent tax rate, cor-
ruption, and a range of government expenditure
c h a ng e t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f n e c e s s i t y a n d
opportunity entrepreneurship. Our main implications
are for (1) Research: Formal and informal institu-
tions need to be considered when studying entrepre-
neurship allocation, particularly in an emerging and
developing country context. Results suggest that the
impact of the same institutional settings and infor-
mal institutions such as corruption on necessity and
opportunity entrepreneurship is not uniform in size
and scope and have different magnitude. The effect
of government expenditure on necessity and oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship is not ubiquitous. (2) Man-
agement: The broader institutional context affects
allocation of entrepreneurship, and potential entre-
preneurs can consider how corruption in particular
can affect them. (3) Policy: Policymakerscan mea-
sure the extent to which opportunity and necessity
entrepreneurship are likely to change, when they
make changes to tax policy, resources for public
spending, and take anti-corruption measures.
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Many countries have seen an increase in government
size and taxes (Mueller, 2004; Tanzi & Schuknecht,
2000). A robust stream of primarily economics research
has examined the influence of government size on eco-
nomic development and social welfare (see Alesina
et al., 2004; Asimakopoulos & Karavias, 2016; Barro,
1990) and entrepreneurship (Nyström, 2008; Audretsch
& Lehmann, 2017; Audretsch et al., 2006, 2019a, b).
However, there is still a paucity of knowledge in iden-
tifying how these components interact with each other to
influence different types of entrepreneurial activity (van
der Zwan et al., 2016). A critical gap remains in the
literature: how government size and institutional envi-
ronment influence different types of entrepreneurship.
To address this gap in the literature, we ask the follow-
ing question: How do government size, tax policy, and
corruption influence entrepreneurial allocation towards
necessity or opportunity entrepreneurship?. This ques-
tion is an in-depth look into how government, the reg-
u l a t o r y e n v i r o nm e n t o f a c o u n t r y , a n d
broader institutions can influenceentrepreneurial cli-
mate. Additionally, the combination of policies and the
institutional climate produces the pull and push factors
as the two opposing forces that contribute todifferent
types of entrepreneurial activity (opportunity and neces-
sity entrepreneurship) in diverse institutional contexts
(Audretsch et al., 2019a, b; Block et al., 2015; Block &
Sandner, 2009; Nikolaev et al., 2018; Stenholm et al.,
2013; van der Zwan et al., 2016; Welter et al., 2019).
Different types of entrepreneurial activities are essen-
tial to consider because the quality of entrepreneurship
dictates the technological change, structural transforma-
tion, and economic development (Amorós et al., 2019;
Belda & Cabrer-Borrás, 2018; van der Zwan et al.,
2016). Compared to necessity entrepreneurship, oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship occurs when entrepreneurs have
other work options but still decide to pursue entrepre-
neurship (Acs et al., 2008; Vivarelli, 2004, 2013).While
entrepreneurship contributes to economic development
and social welfare, not all entrepreneurship activity con-
tributes equally. Therefore, determining the context that
promotes desired entrepreneurial activity is essential
(Baumol, 1990; Baumol & Strom, 2007; Fredström
et al., 2020).
The overall economic environment and governmen-
tal policies play a crucial role and govern these opposing
forces (Fairlie et al., 2011). Opportunity entrepreneurs
may spend less and delay investments during high tax-
ation and recessions, while they are also more likely to
start a business when tax policy and government size are
more conducive; necessity entrepreneurs, on the other
hand, are forced out of the labor force and into entre-
preneurship because of adverse economic conditions
(Shiller, 2017).
Government size is a critical component to consider
because larger government may mean a greater capacity
to provide services and fund public governance activi-
ties. These supports could encourage entrepreneurship
activities by providing safety nets to offset risks, high-
quality inputs related to labor, and efficient capital mar-
kets. Larger government could also mean more inade-
quate governance if it allows overreach or inefficiency
(see Afonso et al., 2005; Hauner &Kyobe, 2010), which
could discourage entrepreneurship activities by compli-
cating the business environment and putting entrepre-
neurs at risk for predatory behavior by government
agents.
Along with government size, tax policy directly af-
fects entrepreneurs’ incentives to enter the market
(Friedman et al., 2000). Government is a core dimension
of any country’s regulatory setup, and taxes provide
revenues for public spending. Taxes, government size,
and corruption are important to consider together
becausegovernment requires tax revenue to operate
and maintainservices, which corruption can affect (see
Belitski et al., 2016; O’Higgins, 2006; Pandey, 2010).
We contribute to the existing literature on en-
trepreneurship and public policy by demonstrating
that government size, corruption, and tax policy do
not have predictably consistent effects ontwo types
of entrepreneurship. To test this article’s hypothe-
ses, we use a panel of 52 countries from 2005 to
2015. The results suggest that the direction and
magnitude of government size, corruption, and
tax policy on different types of entrepreneurship
depend on the form of entrepreneurship.
Second, we contribute to the literature on entrepre-
neurship and inst i tut ions by demonstrat ing
that engagement in opportunity and necessity entrepre-
neurship is shaped by both the regulatory environment
(tax), informal institutions (corruption), and government
size. The study results suggest not all regulatory and
institutional settings have a similar effect on
entrepreneurship.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section 2, we present the relevant literature and
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develop our hypotheses on the direct and moderating
effects of government size, tax policy, and corruption on
entrepreneurship. In Section 3, we discuss our data,
method, and identification strategy. We report results
in Section 4, followed by discussing implications and
next steps for scholars, entrepreneurs, and policymakers
in Section 5.
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1 Government size and opportunity
and necessity entrepreneurship
Government size can determine how, where, and what
resources are allocated in an economy, and this resource
allocation can influence entrepreneurship (Williamson,
2000), shaping protections (or lack of) for entrepreneurs
(Aidis et al., 2012). Large government size could mean
improved ability to provide services by the government
and better inputs for entrepreneurs, such as skilled
workers coming out of effective education systems
(Audretsch et al., 2015) and social services/benefits that
the government generally provides, like health and pub-
lic schools, can boost human capital and quality of life
(Berry& Lowery, 1987). Existing research suggests that
human capital is associated with improved cognitive
skills related to opportunity recognition and exploitation
(Lofstrom, 2013).
Opportunity entrepreneurship requires access to
established infrastructure such as the Internet,
roads, and access to electricity (Audretsch et al.,
2015), and government with resources can better
develop these infrastructures than their counterpart.
Well-developed infrastructures allow entrepreneurs
access to information, mobility, and connectivity.
A large government is also better able to invest in
systems like land and property rights, and intellec-
tual property protections that can be costly to set
up by the individual entrepreneurs and divert nec-
essary resources from the venture activity, yet
these types of protections help opportunity entre-
preneurs (Desai et al., 2013; Estrin et al., 2013).
Large governments can also offer social security and
welfare programs that can mitigate risk and lower the
opportunity cost of going into business instead of wage
employment. Such programs could generate more secu-
rity and encourage risk-taking. For example, if private
health insurance is expensive, wage employment could
be more attractive (see Fairlie et al., 2011; Holtz-Eakin
et al., 1996). Health insurance costs can be a constraint
on entrepreneurs, depending on the health insurance
system’s reach and scope (Fossen & König, 2017). An
expanded safety net could reduce the pressure for a
person to generate income, encouraging risk-taking
(Henrekson, 2005), particularly for welfare programs
associated with monetary transfers (Heinemann, 2008).
Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1a(H1a): Larger government size has a
positive effect on opportunity entrepreneurship.
Potential problems that could accompany larger gov-
ernment are discussed further, when we hypothesize on
corruption. Here, we consider that if larger government
means effective and efficient services and programs, it
could also mean better quality of inputs, resources, and
conditions for entrepreneurship. Government size can
increase entrepreneurial activity by pushing individuals
to undertake entrepreneurship. Manydeveloped coun-
tries have unemployment insurance (UI) and active
labor market programs (ALMP) to promote entrepre-
neurship by pushing unemployed individuals to under-
take entrepreneurship (Agwu et al., 2017; Fadahunsi &
Rosa, 2002; Laffineur et al., 2017). Unemployed indi-
viduals may be forced to undertake entrepreneurship
since they do not have any other option.While the safety
net provisions may serve the unemployed person’s need
for the short term, these programs will not support them
for an extended period. The need for income generation
over the longer term will push individuals to undertake
necessity entrepreneurship.
Hypothesis 1b(H1b): Larger government size has a
positive effect on necessity entrepreneurship.
2.2 Corruption and opportunity
and necessity entrepreneurship
Corruption in the public sector is a de facto reality in
many countries (Estrin et al., 2013; Rose-Ackerman,
1999, 2007). Corruption is commonly conceptualized
as the use of public office for personal benefit (Mauro,
1995; Rose-Ackerman, 2007, 1999). Onone hand, cor-
ruption could have a “greasing” effect for entrepreneurs
by providing a way to circumvent cumbersome regula-
tions by paying bribes (Méon & Weill, 2010); on the
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other hand, it could have a “sanding” effect for those
who cannot pay (Shleifer & Vishny, 2002) because new
ventures may have limited resources (Choi & Thum,
2005; Tonoyan et al., 2010).
Opportunity entrepreneurs need financial resources
for opportunity exploitation, and corruption can increase
constraints on critically important resources (see Dreher
& Gassebner, 2013). Besides, corruption imposes sev-
eral types of costs onopportunity entrepreneurs beyond
just the obvious financial cost. It can increase the busi-
ness financial costs by charging additional unseen fees
on top of what is already anticipated, and redirect funds
away from productivity-enhancing investments by cut-
ting into the total volume of funding available for the
business. Corruption also creates costs in terms of non-
financial resources, shifting the entrepreneur’s time to
negotiating bribes and managing relationships with bu-
reaucrats instead of engaging in value creation activity
(see Tonoyan et al., 2010).
Opportunity entrepreneurs are likely to formally
enter the marketplace through registration and
obtaining required licenses to gain legitimacy. This
legitimization process can help the opportunity en-
trepreneurs to get financial resources. However, cor-
rupt government officials may use this as an exploi-
tation opportunity by refusing to issue a permit or
process a transaction without receiving a bribe (see
Dreher & Gassebner, 2013). Even after obtaining the
required permissions and licenses, opportunity entre-
preneurs can be vulnerable to continued exploitation
by corrupt public agents (see Dreher & Gassebner,
2013). Entrepreneurs may faceconsequences if they
seek recourse and try to access protections offered by
law. Bureaucrats can repeatedly exploit entrepre-
neurs, and each act of corruption further raises their
vulnerability in a system where government agents
make the laws and enforce them.
Another cost of corruption is indirect, resulting from
diverted or lost public spending. These funds could be
spent on education and training programs that improve
the labor market, infrastructures like roads and ports,
health services, and security. The diversion of funds
may not have an immediate tangible effect on an entre-
preneur, but this shapes and raises costs in the broader
economic context in which the entrepreneur must oper-
ate. For example, corruption has been found to reduce
government spending on education (Mauro, 1998); this
underinvestment in training the labor market can raise
costs for entrepreneurs who internalize the costs of
training or acquiring skilled labor, i.e., higher salaries
because of fewer local hires or costs to recruit from
abroad.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Corruption has a negative
effect on opportunity entrepreneurship.
A corrupt government agent and an entrepreneur
both participate in the corrupt transaction, and govern-
ment agents have the upper hand because entrepreneurs
rely on them to obtain licenses and permits (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). The relationship may be coercive if the
entrepreneur has no other option but to engage with the
bribe-seeking government agent. For necessity entrepre-
neurs, who might not be able to afford the registration
and licensing fees or may not be willing to register,
theymay react to the corrupt environment by staying in
the informal sector.
Corruption can raise uncertainty over time because
the entrepreneur is unsure how many future transactions
will require bribes or the number of future bribes. This
uncertainty fundamentally affects how an individual
entrepreneur can reliably plan for costs and calculate
expected profits. Engagement in the entrepreneurial ac-
tivity itself has significant uncertainty, and necessity
entrepreneursmight avoid engaging with corrupt offi-
cials by remaining in the informal sector and by reduc-
ing the cost of formal payments and regulation. In the
long run, it increases costs,vulnerability, and is a barrier
to business growth. Also, it creates uncertainty and
increases the opportunity costs of staying in necessity
entrepreneurship. Thereby, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Corruption has a negative
effect on necessity entrepreneurship.
2.3 Tax and opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship
A large body of literature has found mixed results relat-
ed to the relationship between the tax rate and entrepre-
neurship. An overly simplified interpretation could be
that paying taxes discourages entrepreneurs who seek to
maximize profits. However, the relationship appears to
be far more nuanced and complex because tax policy
affects entrepreneurs beyond simply their profit
margins.
Tax policy can affect entrepreneurs through three
channels: income shifting, risk subsidy, and risk-
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sharing (Cullen & Gordon, 2007). First, income shifting
occurs when tax policy redistributes income from high-
income individuals to low-income individuals. This in-
come transfer could provide more capital to entrepre-
neurs with less access to financial resources or in low-
income households to start a business. At the same time,
this could relieve some of the pressures that push
underresourced people to become necessity entrepre-
neurs, and mean that fewer people need to do so.
Tax policy could induce a risk subsidy effect by
providing welfare services that might encourage
potential entrepreneurs to take on more significant
risks and forego immediate income because welfare
programs could meet basic needs. Henrekson et al.
(2010) argued that taxes could generate an insurance
effect by offsetting total losses by serving as an insur-
ance policy for the entrepreneur and reducing risk.
Tax policy can have a risk-sharing effect by alleviat-
ing some of the financial burdens on entrepreneurs and
providing some fallback if the business fails. Domar and
Musgrave (1944)described the tax system as a way for
entrepreneurs to share risk under adverse conditions. If
an entrepreneur can share the risk, this could encourage
entrepreneurs to take on greater risk. This could mean
that very successful businesses might offset costs of
failure for other businesses; in this way, higher taxes
could be seen by opportunity entrepreneurs as cutting
deeply into their profits if they become very successful,
lowering their returns to entrepreneurship, which could
discourage them. Based on this discussion, we
hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3a(H3a): Tax rate has a negative effect on
opportunity entrepreneurship.
Hypothesis 3b(H3b): Tax rate has a negative effect
on necessity entrepreneurship.
2.4 Tax, government size and opportunity
entrepreneurship and necessity entrepreneurship
Taxes and government size are interrelated (Bergh &
Henrekson, 2011). Scholars in the “spend-and-tax” school
of thought suggest that higher taxes mean more spending
(Goedhuys & Sleuwaegen, 2010; Tybout, 2000). Large
government and high taxescould positively influence en-
trepreneurship by creating and providing the necessary
services and public goods(Goedhuys & Sleuwaegen,
2010; Tybout, 2000). For example, infrastructure is an
essential component for entrepreneurs to build a successful
business and this resource may be more important for
oppo r t un i t y en t r ep r eneu r s t han nece s s i t y
entrepreneurs.A high quality of transportation and
communication should makes it easier for an individual
to engage in opportunity entrepreneurship to grow and
reach customers outside the region or the country..
The government can act as a “benevolent dictator” by
helping to address market failure by providing public
goods otherwise not provided by the private sector and
aiming to maximize social welfare (Musgrave, 1959;
Pigou, 1928). Public provision such as safety are neces-
sary for an entrepreneur to be confident about investing
in entrepreneurship activity. As these new ventures
grow, tax revenue generated from successful entrepre-
neurs can be redistributed to support public works
(Henrekson, 2005).
The government can also help with the supply side of
opportunity-driven and growth-oriented entrepreneurs
(Estrin et al., 2013) by creating programs that support
entrepreneurial activity and redistributing tax income in
a way to sponsor high-quality and society-oriented busi-
nesses (Cooper, 2003; Cumming et al., 2018; Lerner &
Kegler, 2000). Manycountries have funding programs
that help generate high-growth entrepreneurial activity
(Cooper, 2003; Lerner & Kegler, 2000). Therefore,
although we expected higher taxes to discourage oppor-
tunity entrepreneurs directly, if a combination of larger
government and taxes effectively produces conducive
conditions where opportunity entrepreneurs have great-
er access to resources, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4a (H4): Government size and tax joint-
ly increase opportunity entrepreneurship.
For necessity entrepreneurs, a high tax rate and a
large government can create a complex governance
mechanism that could reduce entrepreneurs’ incentives
to register their businesses (Estrin et al., 2013) formally.
In their study of 47 countries, Aidis et al. (2012) found
that a larger government sector negatively influences
entrepreneurial activity. Parker (2018) argued that a
large government sector could discourage entrepreneur-
ship by reducing its payoffs because of higher taxes and
will be particularly difficult for necessity-driven entre-
preneurs with the lack of resources. Entrepreneurs gen-
erally seek to maximize profit (Baumol, 1990), and
taxes take away a portion of profits generated by their
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efforts. A large government size also increases admin-
istrative expenditure requiring a larger budget. To sup-
port these increased expenses, in most cases, higher
taxes are needed (Acemoglu, 2005). Therefore, govern-
ment size and taxation can create a virtuous circle.
Necessity entrepreneurs may also enjoy the benefit of
a big government, such as well-established infrastruc-
tures, subsidizing housing, and social security, which
reduces the supply of necessity-driven entrepreneurs.
Based on this, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4b (H4): Government size and tax joint-
ly decrease necessity entrepreneurship.
2.5 Corruption, government size and necessity
and opportunity entrepreneurship
Government size can be related to whether there is an
environment for corrupt behavior and rent-seeking by
authorities (Belitski et al., 2016; Bruton et al., 2010).If
larger government means more or more complex regula-
tions to comply with,this could create the opportunity for
corruption. Alesina andAngeletos (2005, p. 1241) argued
that a big government could increase corruption since
self-serving government agents can use regulations to
extract rents from entrepreneurs (Djankov et al., 2002;
Peltzman, 1976; Tullock, 1967).
As government size grows, it can crowd out private
resources’ efficient allocation (see Aidis et al., 2012)
and redirect investing in the business, affecting both
necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs. This can be
accelerated by decentralization, which can emerge due
to expanding government, giving public officials more
opportunity to use discretion in implementing policies
(Fisman & Gatti, 2002), especially at the local level. A
key argument in favor of decentralization is that it
allows for “closer” governance and responsiveness to
local needs, there by increasing public officials’ ac-
countability. However, proximity to local populations,
particularly in areas where political and economic pow-
er may be entrenched, could raise vulnerability
toexploitation (see Fisman &Gatti, 2002). While decen-
tralization can create additional administration layers
that require greater engagement with the government
(Fan et al., 2009), creating more opportunities to seek
bribes from entrepreneurs (Chowdhury et al., 2019),
opportunity entrepreneurs who are likely to have more
access to resources may try to gain advantages by pay-
ing the bribes.
Taxpayers in corrupt countries are likely to have
lower trust that revenues will be used to provide quality
public services. Trust in government can bolster tax
morale and deter tax evasion (see Hammar et al.,
2009; Torgler, 2003), encouraging compliance with
tax requirements (see Scholz & Lubell, 1998), while
mistrust reshapes incentives forentrepreneurship
(Audretsch et al., 2021) and higher corruption redistrib-
utes government expenditure for corrupt needs and rent-
seeking. When faced with high corruption and a low
level of government trust, both potential necessity and
opportunity entrepreneurs may be wary of exposure to
rent-seeking.
Subsidy programs are another area where government
officials can exercise discretion, and in corrupt countries,
government expenditure and support may be directed in
ways that providelittle benefit for the community and
region. Corruption can affect the allocation of resources
and social programs targeting appropriate places (Black-
burn & Forgues-Puccio, 2007), with both types of entre-
preneurs losing from high corruption and larger govern-
ment. Paying bribes could limit entrepreneur’s growth
and make them withdraw from the market, while high
uncertainty and the tax burden could prevent new entry,
including necessity-driven entrepreneurs. For the reasons
discussed above, we thus consider that:
Hypothesis 5a(H5a): Large government and high
corruption will reduce opportunity entrepreneurship.
Hypothesis 5b(H5b): Large government and high
corruption will reduce necessity entrepreneurship.
3 Data and method
3.1 Data
We construct our sample by matching data from the
following sources at the country level for 2005-2015:
World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshot
(WBGES), World Development Indicators (WDI), Do-
ing Business (DB) Database, Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor (GEM) National Expert Survey and Adult Pop-
ulation survey, and the Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors (WGI) and Internationally Monetary Fund.
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The WBGES provides an internationally comparable
indicator of new business registrations at the country
level worldwide, based on business registrar informa-
tion. The WDI is a compilation of comparable national
statistics on a wide range of economic trends, including
poverty and development. The DB Project tracks busi-
ness regulations at the national and subnational levels,
using several indicators to capture different regulatory
dimensions. The GEM is a cross-national comparative
data effort that uses general population surveys (Adult
Population Survey) to measure the nature and level of
entrepreneurial activity and expert-based surveys (Na-
tional Expert Survey) to track the conditions in the
environment for entrepreneurship. GEM data has been
used extensively in the entrepreneurship literature to
understand various phenomena related to entrepreneur-
ship. The WGI report on governance indicators at the
country level, based on a combination of the businesses,
citizens, and expert survey respondents’ views.
Our sample captures variance across both developed
and developing countries for 2005-2015, and our final
dataset covers 52 countries and comprises 272 observa-
tions. We use unbalanced panel data with missing
values for several countries (see Appendix, Table 4 for
details).
It is essential to acknowledge the heterogeneity that
characterizes both the explanatory and dependent vari-
ables in our study, which we argue is a core to gaining a
more accurate understanding of the nuances embedded
in the relationships being tested (see Audretsch et al.,
2019b).
3.2 Dependent variables
We use two measures for entrepreneurship. These mea-
sures are taken from GEM’s Adult Population Survey:
necessity entrepreneurship and opportunity entrepre-
neurship, which are calculated as a subset of total entre-
preneurial activity (TEA), defined as the percentage of
the population that is either a nascent entrepreneur ac-
tively involved in starting a new venture or an owner-
manager of a new business less than 42 months old.
Necessity entrepreneurship is measured as the percent-
age of total entrepreneurial activity that reported no
other option for work. Opportunity entrepreneurship is
measured as the percentage of total entrepreneurial ac-
tivity driven by opportunity, reporting that the main
driver for being involved in entrepreneurship is to be
independent or increase (rather than maintain) income
(Reynolds et al., 2005). This distinction has allowed
scholars to observe the impact of economic and socio-
cultural factors on entrepreneurial motivation
(Hechavarria & Reynolds, 2009).
3.3 Explanatory variables
We include various types of government expenditures
(as a percentage of GDP) from the IMF Government
Finance Statistics (GFS, 2021) to measure the link be-
tween government size and entrepreneurship types.
Based on Estrin et al. (2013) and Aidis et al. (2012),
we use a range of public expenditure measures, such as
expenditure on public order and safety to GDP, expen-
diture on economic affairs to GDP, expenditure on
housing and community amenities to GDP, expenditure
on recreation, culture, and religion to GDP, education
expenditure to GDP, and social security expenditure to
GDP. We also include a measure of public administra-
tion expenditure in total government expenditure, which
is predicted to negatively affect entrepreneurship
(Bruton et al., 2010).
Corruption is taken from the WGI, reflecting the
extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption and
the capture of the state elites and private interests
(Anokhin & Schulze, 2009). Country scores range from
− 2.5 (high corruption) to 2.5 (low corruption). We
reversed the measure by multiplying by −1 so that 2.5
corresponds to high corruption, and − 2.5 corresponds to
low corruption.
Our measure for the tax rate is the percentage of taxes
and mandatory contributions payable by businesses af-
ter deductions and exemptions in commercial profits
(Djankov et al., 2010; Kaufmann et al., 2009; World
Bank, 2004, 2007). Recent research suggests that the
complexity of paying taxes, in addition to the tax rate,
matters (Braunerhjelm et al., 2021; Djankov et al.,
2010), so we also include tax time from the DB data-
base, measured as the number of days needed to prepare
and pay taxes (Belitski et al., 2016).
3.4 Control variables
Several control variables reflect vital trends that could
affect entrepreneurship in our study. Economic devel-
opment is an essential consideration for entrepreneur-
ship (Parker, 2004) and is measured as GDP per capita
(constant 2010 USD), taken from WDI. We use GDP
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per capita to construct a binary variable “rich” that takes
the value of one if a country’s GDP per capita is greater
or equal to 25,000 USD (constant 2010 USD), zero
otherwise. GDP per capita is highly correlated with
corruption, while “rich” is not and could be included
in the model. Human capital can take different forms
and is a typical theoretical lens to study entrepreneurship
(see Marvel et al., 2016); our measure for human capital
is the percentage of the population enrolled in tertiary
education, taken from WDI.
We account for information about private credit bu-
reau, taken from DB, and measured as a private credit
registry that gathers information about individuals and
firms listed by a private credit bureau with information
on their borrowing history from the past 5 years (a
percentage of the population). The availability of credit
is measured by domestic credit given to the private
sector by the banks (% of GDP) was taken from WDI
(Chowdhury et al., 2019).
We account for unemployment in a country because
it can motivate some individuals to seek entrepreneurial
activity (Wennekers et al., 2005) and can be useful to
understand necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship
outcomes. Unemployment was measured as the percent-
age of the labor force available for and seeking employ-
ment, but without employment, taken from WDI. We
also account for labor force participation by including
labor force participation, gathered fromWDI, reflecting
the percentage of the total population participating in the
labor force.
We control for entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the en-
vironment in which they are embedded (Edelman&Yli-
Renko, 2010). Therefore, we include government sup-
port for entrepreneurship, measured as the extent to
which public policies support entrepreneurship collect-
ed from GEM. This variable is expected to have a
positive effect on entrepreneurship activity.
Definitions and data sources for all variables in our
study are provided in Table 1.
4 Empirical strategy
We first check correlations among our variables: Neces-
sity and opportunity entrepreneurship are negatively
correlated (− 0.75). Government safety expenditure,
expenditure on housing, and economic affairs are posi-
tively associated with necessity entrepreneurship, while
they are negatively associated with opportunity entre-
preneurship (see Table 2).
Corruption is positively correlated with necessity
entrepreneurship (0.68) and negatively with opportunity
entrepreneurship (− 0.60).
Our first concern was the covariance structure of the
control variable matrix. We are unlikely to estimate
partial effects without bias, as several variables included
in the model are causally related; this is not a
multicollinearity issue but an endogeneity issue. First,
government size can be a function of the tax base’s size
and government programs, including those serving busi-
nesses and the unemployed.
Second, corruption can be associated with entry reg-
ulation, taxes, licensing, and many other regulations
(Belitski et al., 2016; Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Rose-
Ackerman, 2007). Third, government expenditure could
create more opportunities for corruption, such as
through public procurement. Unobserved factors that
affect government size could also affect corruption and
taxes.
Because these variables are causally related to each
other, the effects of interrelated variables are being
mediated (moderated) by others, and they cannot be
included together in the same regressions (Angrist &
Pischke, 2008), this makes it difficult to assess the
independent effect of any one of the variables. We
control for this interdependency effect using an alterna-
tive modeling strategy by fitting four models jointly.
First, we combine four equations in a mixed-process
model, incorporating both continuous responses (entre-
preneurship type, government size) and ordinal re-
sponses (corruption). We modeled a simultaneous sys-
tem of equations: first for necessity entrepreneurship,
second for opportunity entrepreneurship, third for gov-
ernment size, and fourth for corruption. Second, the cmp
framework in Stata 15 allows for the different observa-
tions to enter each equation in the model, with available
observations being used to estimate each equation
parameter.
Given the potential interdependence between the four
equations, they should be estimated simultaneously.
The FIML estimates produced by cmp estimation can
handle this form of simultaneity (Baum et al., 2017). A
maximum likelihood estimator of a seemingly unrelated
equation (SUR) system (Zellner, 1962) can consistently
estimate parameters in an essential subclass of mixed-
process simultaneous systems: those are recursive and
simultaneous (Roodman 2011). Government size is
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Table 1 Variable descriptions, sources, and descriptive statistics
Variable Description Source Mean Std.
dev.
Min Max
Necessity entrepreneurship Percentage of those involved in Total early-stage Entrepreneurial Ac-
tivity (TEA) who claim they had no other options for work and just
tomaintain their income. TEA—the percentage of 18–64 population
who are either a nascent entrepreneur or owner-manager of a new
business.
GEM 22.44 12.31 4.00 61.00
Opportunity
entrepreneurship
Percentage of those involved in TEA who claim to be driven by
opportunity, and who indicate the main driver for being involved is
being independent or increasing their income
GEM 51.10 13.19 10.00 82.00
Rich Binary variable = 1 for countries with GDP per capita in 2010 USD
constant prices greater or equal 25,000USD, zero otherwise
WDI 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Private credit bureau Private credit registry coverage: individuals and firms listed by a
private credit bureau with information on their borrowing history
from the past 5 years (% of population)
DB 12.66 21.22 0.00 100.00
Human capital Total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of
age, 5-year age group following on from secondary school leaving
(% of total population)
WDI 55.70 19.77 4.00 97.97
Tax rate The amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable by
businesses after accounting for allowable deductions and
exemptions as a share of commercial profits.
DB 43.94 17.91 8.30 107.70
Corruption Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The score ranges
from − 2.5 to 2.5. We reversed the order by multiplying by − 1 (2.5
= most corrupt, − 2.5 = least corrupt).




Tax time Time required to prepare and pay taxes (hours) DB 289.50 333.40 12.00 2600.00
Credit Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% GDP) refers to financial
resources provided to the private sector by other depository
corporations (deposit taking corporations except central banks).
WDI 82.40 53.33 10.10 312.15
Entry density New business density (new firm registrations per 1000 people ages
15–64)
WBGES 4.06 4.46 0.04 28.12
Unemployment Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without
work but available for and seeking employment (% of total labor
force).
WDI 7.89 5.20 0.70 32.20
Government support The extent to which public policies support entrepreneurship. (a)
Entrepreneurship as a relevant economic issue and (b) taxes or
regulations are either size-neutral or encourage new and SMEs
(scale 1–5)
GEM 2.55 0.45 1.65 4.55
Labor force Labor force participation rate, % of total population (modeled ILO
estimate)
WDI 61.04 7.60 42.36 82.24
Government expenditure indicators
Public services expenditure Expenditure on general public services, % GDP IMF 6.38 2.09 3.23 17.11
Safety expenditure Expenditure on public order and safety, % GDP IMF 1.72 0.46 0.82 3.70
Economic affair expenditure Expenditure on economic affairs, % GDP IMF 5.14 2.34 1.78 25.04
Housing expenditure Expenditure on housing and community amenities, % GDP IMF 0.88 0.68 -0.13 3.57
Culture expenditure Expenditure on recreation, culture, and religion, % GDP IMF 1.30 0.55 0.34 3.57
Education expenditure Expenditure on education, % GDP IMF 5.19 1.12 3.21 8.09
Social security expenditure Expenditure on social protection, % GDP IMF 15.70 4.34 4.58 24.84
Public administration share Share of public administration expenditure in total government
expenditure
IMF 14.09 3.50 7.96 24.65
Source: calculation based on GEM, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor; WEF, World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report
(2005–2016); DB, Doing Business; WDI, World Development Indicators; EFI, Economic Freedom Index; WGI, World Governance
Indicator; IMF, International Monetary Fund
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likely to influence corruption and vice versa and is
associated with several explanatory factors hypothe-
sized to influence government size, corruption, and
entrepreneurship. There is potentially a more efficient
approach as it allows estimation of possible cross-
equation correlations for each country between equa-
tions with entrepreneurship types as dependent variables
and equations with the institutional environment as de-
pendent variables. Besides, we controlled for the year
and country-specific effects.
Given the panel structure of the data, the equation
was estimated using the observations from the various
datasets that could be matched by country and year. The
entire sample includes 272 observations for 52 coun-
tries. We used the fixed-effects (FE) estimator as it
concentrates on differences that, over time, characterize
a country. This is why the FE estimator is also referred
to as the “within” estimator. It explains to what extent a
given country’s change in a variable of interest affects
its entrepreneurship rates. Our estimates are “within”
effect, allowing us to identify the factors that explain
the differences between the countries in the panel and
control for country-specific unobserved characteristics
over time. Thus, the FE estimates should provide a more
exhaustive scenario of the drivers of entrepreneurship
than random effect estimation, which follows a stronger
assumption. The use of the FE estimator also resolves a
simultaneity bias induced by unobservable factors and is
preferred.
The model with country and time-fixed effects is as
follows:






β12zi;t−1 þ ρ1i þ λ1t þ u1 i;t−1ð Þ
where Ei, t is a necessity (opportunity) entrepreneurship
in a country i at time t. We deal with panel data for each
dependent and independent variable. Xi, t − 1 is a vector
of explanatory variables—the size of government (vari-
ety of government expenditures), corruption, and tax
rate of country i at time t. Zi, t − 1 is a vector of control
exogenous variables for a country i at time t. Moreover,
we include two additional vectors of fixed country ef-
fects: ρi, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of a
country i over time t, and λt is a vector of time-fixed
(entity invariant) effects over each period t across all
Table 2 Correlation matrix
1. Necessity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
2. Opportunity -0.75* 1
3. Rich -0.65* 0.58* 1
4. Private Credit Bureau -0.01 -0.13* -0.01 1
5. Human Capital -0.46* 0.44* 0.63* -0.04 1
6. Tax rate 0.03 -0.01 -0.12* 0.20* 0.03 1
7. Corrupon 0.68* -0.60* -0.66* 0.08 -0.52* 0.24* 1
8. Tax me 0.26* -0.14* -0.35* 0.10 -0.21* 0.34* 0.44* 1
9. Credit -0.56* 0.43* 0.66* -0.03 0.44* -0.37* -0.62* -0.38* 1
10. Entry density -0.30* 0.22* 0.15* -0.13* 0.19* -0.26* -0.33* -0.18* 0.45* 1
11. Unemployment 0.56* -0.61* -0.38* 0.177* -0.38* -0.14* 0.35* 0.01 -0.27* -0.06 1
12. Government support -0.32* 0.29* 0.36* -0.03 0.05 -0.22* -0.46* -0.35* 0.43* 0.04 -0.16* 1
13. Labor Force -0.54* 0.48* 0.42* -0.21* 0.20* -0.15* -0.63* -0.22* 0.56* 0.33* -0.46* 0.29* 1
14. Safety expenditure 0.45* -0.53* -0.52* 0.12 -0.51* -0.03 0.57* 0.25* -0.27* 0.06 0.61* -0.34* -0.45* 1
15. Economic affairs expenditure 0.23* -0.26* -0.21* 0.04 -0.08 -0.11 0.13 -0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.19* -0.11 -0.21* 0.24* 1
16. Housing expenditure 0.57* -0.42* -0.61* -0.07 -0.40* -0.26* 0.49* 0.15* -0.22* -0.01 0.39* -0.18* -0.38* 0.53* 0.34* 1
17. Culture expenditure -0.18* 0.23* 0.01 -0.02 0.11 -0.29* -0.21* -0.05 0.32* 0.39* -0.13 0.02 0.32* -0.11 0.27* 0.08 1
18. Educaon expenditure -0.51* 0.44* 0.39* 0.04 0.33* -0.12 -0.55* -0.22* 0.42* 0.52* -0.20* 0.23* 0.43* -0.19* -0.07 -0.42* 0.50* 1
19. Social security expenditure -0.22* 0.12 0.28* 0.11 0.26* 0.33* -0.30* -0.19* 0.03 -0.36* -0.04 0.27* -0.03 -0.31* -0.06 -0.24* -0.02 0.11 1
20. Public administraon share -0.01 -0.06 -0.12 0.09 0.12 0.32* 0.26* 0.22* -0.20* -0.32* 0.06 -0.11 -0.28* -0.16* -0.21* -0.22* -0.11 -0.07 0.06
Note: Level of statistical significance *0.05%. Source: calculation based on GEM, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor; WEF, World
Economic ForumGlobal Competitiveness Report (2005–2016);DB, Doing Business;WDI, World Development Indicators; EFI, Economic
Freedom Index; WGI, World Governance Indicator; IMF, International Monetary Fund
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countries i. The error term is denoted by ui, t − 1 for a
country i, at time t.
We lagged all explanatory and control variables
by 1 year for robustness checks and to rule out
possible endogeneity in all equations. There could
be a time lag for tax policy, government spending,
and corruption to affect and shape entrepreneurs’
behavior. For example, a new tax rate could be
passed in 1 year but enforced in the following year,
or it could take several months for entrepreneurs to
learn about new government programs. It is plausi-
ble to assume that regulatory changes and govern-
ment expenditure will affect outcomes in the next
financial year, as they cannot be immediately
applied.
5 Results
The results of our fixed-effects panel data estimations
are reported in Table 3. Results are grouped as follows:
specifications 1–4 are for necessity entrepreneurship,
and specif icat ions 5–8 are for oppor tuni ty
entrepreneurship.
In hypotheses 1a and 1b, we posited that gov-
ernment size and both types of entrepreneurship
have a positive relationship. Our results do not
support H1a that government size increases oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship; an increase ineconomic af-
fairs expenditure by 1% to GDP reduces opportu-
nity entrepreneurship by (β = − 0.77, p < 0.05). An
increase in culture and recreation expenditure by
the government reduces opportunity entrepreneur-
ship by 8.79% (β = − 8.79, p < 0.01), while an
increase in social security expenditure reduces op-
portunity entrepreneurship by 2.20% (β = − 2.20, p
< 0.01). Interestingly, an increase of public admin-
istration share in total government expenditure re-
duces opportunity entrepreneurship by 1.51% (β =
− 1.51, p < 0.001), which could be associated with
a negative effect of bureaucratic government (Aidis
et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 2013). With regard to
hypothesis 1b, while we find that social security
expenditure is positively associated with necessity
entrepreneurship (β = 1.55, p < 0.05), supporting
H1b, we find that safety-related expenditure
reduces necessity entrepreneurship (β = − 12.50,
p < 0.01).
We find strong support for H2a and H2b—
corruption has a negative effect on both necessity
(β = − 5.87, p < 0.05) (spec. 2, Table 3) and
opportunity (β = − 10.49, p < 0.05) (spec. 6,
Table 3). Given the confidence intervals’ distribu-
tion, corruption’s negative effect on opportunity
entrepreneurship is twice as strong as on necessity
entrepreneurship, demonstrating that opportunity
entrepreneurship is worse affected by corruption.
In H3a and H3b, we posited that the tax rate has a
negative impact on both necessity and opportunity
entrepreneurship. We find support for both H3a and
H3b: an increase of 1% in tax will reduce necessity
entrepreneurship by 0.43% (β = − 0.43, p < 0.01)
(spec. 2, Table 3) and opportunity by 0.45% (β =
− 0.45, p < 0.01) (spec. 6, Table 3). The effect of the
tax change on both types of entrepreneurs is very similar
(see Braunerhjelm et al., 2021).
In H4a and H4b, we posited that an increase in
government size and tax rate increases opportunity
entrepreneurship and reduces necessity entrepreneur-
ship, respectively. When we consider opportunity
entrepreneurship (spec 7, Table 3), we note that only
an increase in tax rate and public administration
expenditure share adds to opportunity entrepreneur-
ship (β = 0.11, p < 0.01), while the effect of public
administration expenditure share remains negative
and statistically significant, partly supporting H4a.
Other interaction coefficients in spec. 7 (Table 3)
are insignificant, which means that an increase in
tax rate and government size does not change oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship. We found a negative effect
of housing government expenditure on necessity en-
trepreneurship (β = − 0.44, p < 0.01) (spec. 3,
Table 3) supporting H4b. Other interactions remain
insignificant (spec.3, Table 3).
Finally, we found that an increase in social se-
curity expenditure in countries with high corruption
increases necessity (β = 1.34, p < 0.05) (spec. 4,
Table 3) entrepreneurship and reduces opportunity
entrepreneurship (β = − 1.04, p < 0.05) (spec. 8,
Table 3). An increase in government size related to
economic affairs expenditure facilitates necessity
entrepreneurship by 1.31%, which contrasts our
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Table 3 Fixed-effects estimation results
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DV Necessity entrepreneurship Opportunity entrepreneurship



































































































































































































































































































− 0.06 − 7.17* 0.54 18.39***
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hypothesized relationship. Safety expenditure re-
duces necessity entrepreneurship (β = − 7.17, p <
0.01) (spec. 4, Table 3) and increases opportunity
entrepreneurship (β = 18.39, p < 0.01) (spec. 8,
Table 3). The evidence for H5 is mixed and dem-
onstrates that not all government expenditure has a
ubiquitous effect on the type of entrepreneurship
activity.
Overall, our findings illustrate the importance of
considering the heterogeneity of entrepreneurship.
We find mixed support for all our hypotheses.
The results for our control variables are as
follows. Economic development proxied by “rich”
is not associated with necessity and opportunity
entrepreneurship, highlighting that both types of
entrepreneurs can exist in countries with different
levels of economic development. The private credit
bureau is negatively associated with necessity entre-
preneurship but positively with opportunity. A share
of the population with tertiary education increases
opportunity entrepreneurship and is not associated
with necessity entrepreneurship. Government sup-
port has no direct effect on the type of entrepreneur-
ship activity, while the effect changes when we
control for interaction effects. We find that unem-
ployment is negatively associated with opportunity
entrepreneurship (spec. 6, Table 3) and is not asso-
ciated with necessity entrepreneurship (spec. 2,
Table 3).
Table 3 (continued)
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Interaction: safety expenditure
(H5/H4)















































































N 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274
r2 within .17 .36 .41 .42 .24 .47 .53 .5
r2 overall .12 .14 .18 .05 .45 .06 .01 .26
r2 between .09 .23 .28 .15 .45 .03 .07 .20










− 556.48 − 545.51 − 545.13
F test for fixed-effects 7.07 5.56 4.76 4.67 6.09 6.85 5.6 5.99
Sigma u 11.29 25.68 29.91 22.86 13.38 22.34 26.19 23.16
Sigma e 5.06 4.69 4.65 4.61 6.14 5.43 5.29 5.27
Rho .83 .96 .97 .96 .82 .94 .96 .95
Note: Level of statistical significance *0.05%; **0.01%, and ***0.001%. Standard errors robust for heteroskedasticity are in parenthesis.
Reference year 2005. Reference country = Afghanistan. Number of obs. 272. Number of countries: 52
Source: authors’ calculation
Necessity or opportunity? Government size, tax policy, corruption, and implications for entrepreneurship
6 Discussion and conclusion
Entrepreneurship activity is vital for economic develop-
ment, so policymakers and scholars are interested in
determining components that positively influence these
activities and understanding entrepreneurial motivation
to enter the market. This paper has examined how tax
policies, government size, and corruption influence ne-
cessity and opportunity entrepreneurship. We use a
2005–2015 country-level panel data matching five dis-
tinctive datasets for 52 countries and show that a high
corruption and tax will negatively affect both types of
entrepreneurs, while government size effect on necessi-
ty and opportunity is distinctive and conditional on
different types of government expenditures. Our results
suggest that different types of entrepreneurship require
different types of policies. Not all kinds of entrepreneur-
ship contribute equally to society or in the same
way (Block & Sandner, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2005;
Vivarelli, 2004; Vivarelli, 2013) and policy makers can
consider how to support the type of entrepreneurship
they want to prioritize. Our empirical approach enables
us to provide detailed new insights. This approach is
appropriate for research on the complex institutional
environment when one-size-fits-all government expen-
diture is not enough (Levie & Autio, 2011).
Our results suggest that the impact of the same insti-
tutional settings (corruption) on necessity and opportu-
nity entrepreneurship is not uniform (see Levie & Autio,
2011) as the size of the effect varies between types of
government expenditure. Additionally, while
corruptionmay not discourage a share of necessity en-
trepreneurs, the overall resultremains negative. Entre-
preneurs are constantly engaging in activities to help
their ventures and in some cases may seek to leverage
corruption to their advantage, but boththe necessity and
opportunity entrepreneurs are adversely affected by
corruption.
When it comes to the interaction effect of corruption
and government size on opportunity and necessity en-
trepreneurship as the direction of the relationship de-
pends on the type of government expenditure (i.e., safe-
ty, economic affairs, housing, education, social security,
public administration). Our results indicate that
investing in economic affairs and increasing social se-
curity can support necessity entrepreneurs, andsafety
expenditure can supportopportunity entrepreneurs. We
are not able to test if there is a shift or transition between
people who become necessity and opportunity entrepre-
neurship when government spending changes. Our
study results also reveal that, in many cases, the effects
of taxes and corruption in combination with heteroge-
neous government expenditure are not the same for
opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship. For taxes
and corruption, the effect depends on what government
invests in and whether it targets to increase the supply of
entrepreneursor increase the demand for entrepreneurs.
To increase entrepreneurial activity in a country, gov-
ernment plays an important role. However, government
investment may have a different effect on necessity
entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs, who may
also leverage the government’s services differently.
6.1 Study limitations and future research
While we included time lags in our model, there may be
an endogeneity between government size, corruption,
and entrepreneurship activity which in the future re-
search may require instruments and longitudinal data
with longer lags for robustness check. The GEM
entrepreneurship-related measures also have their limi-
tations, notably the entrepreneurship measures’ low
comparability between developed and developing coun-
tries (Reynolds et al., 2002). It should be noted that we
controlled for time-invariant systematic measurement
errors using country-level fixed-effects, which helps
reduce concerns about these measurements.
We provide fresh empirical insights to the impor-
tance of considering heterogeneous institutions and
heterogeneous entrepreneurship outcomes. We add to
recent studies that found institutional conditions can
play a role in shaping the nature and quality of
entrepreneurship activity. Chowdhury et al. (2019) and
Sutter et al. (2017), for instance, assert that regulation
matters for net entrepreneurship productivity score, and
it can play a role in shaping cognitive and informal
economy dimensions. Future research can examine
how policymakers can formulate policies to target spe-
cific types of entrepreneurship outcomes that are salient
in their contexts, for example if they wanted to support
more opportunity entrepreneurs.
D. B. Audretsch et al.
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